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The Rhetoric of Public Expectation: An
Enquiry into the Concepts of
Responsiveness and Responsibility
Under the Environmental Laws
Gerald M. Levine*
I. Introduction
A. The Craft of Communication
Statutes are a form of literary composition. They may not
share all of the same purposes as other compositions, but they
do share certain features and techniques which are the com-
mon property of all writers. Compositions are organizations of
words and ideas. Particular kinds of compositions dictate dif-
ferent organizations, so that what may be appropriate to one
is not appropriate to another. Statutes state the law. They are
read for instruction, as other compositions may be read for
entertainment. Whether for instruction or entertainment,
readers sensitive to language will be able to glean more from a
particular composition than what is literally said. For exam-
ple, evidence of a writer's meaning can be found not only in
the choice of words, but also in their arrangement.
Lawmakers have the same imperative need as authors of
other kinds of works to state what they intend in a manner
* The author is a partner of the law firm of Gallet, Dreyer & Berkey. He re-
ceived his Juris Doctor from Brooklyn Law School, has a Ph.D. from New York Uni-
versity, and received a B.A. from the University of California at Berkeley.
389
1
PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW
that their readers can understand. To accomplish this, they
use rhetorical techniques and organizational principles which
are at once common to the craft of communication and, at
their most effective, integral to the message. The kind of stat-
utes discussed below embody society's response to actual and
potential degrading of the environment. Environmental stat-
utes encourage people to act responsibly. Those who are
targeted are more likely to act responsibily if they know what
the public expects of them and how government and courts
will respond to their failure to comply with statutory
mandates.
This article examines public expectation and expectation
of private response, as these are revealed in statutory lan-
guage, organization, and judicial construction of environmen-
tal laws. Interpretation of any text rests on a cultural under-
standing of what words mean in their context. Where
meanings are uncertain or disputed, then interpretation rests
on deducing meaning from evidence within and outside of the
text. Expectation - that is, what is expected of one - is im-
plicit in statutes, and its presence is some evidence of legisla-
tive intention. Misreading of expectation has far reaching con-
sequences. After all, it is for departure from expecations that
penalties are imposed.
Language and organization are traditionally concerns of
rhetoric. Rhetoric is an ancient discipline. Even though rhe-
torical and compositional strategies may not generally be as-
sociated with legislation, they are nevertheless fundamental to
composing statutes. In fact, it is impossible to imagine stat-
utes being effective without rhetoric. The way in which mate-
rial is set forth is important, both for itself and for what it
contributes to understanding content, although ultimately it
is content itself that most concerns statutory readers and
courts.
The search for statutory meaning takes interested readers
and courts deeply into both text and context. Text is the re-
sult of writers making linguistic, rhetorical, and compositional
choices. From the choices lawmakers make readers infer atti-
tude and expectation, and these inferences are consequential
in influencing judicial interpretations of public law. To a
[Vol. 8
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greater degree than other laws, environmental laws contain
the reasons for their existence and explain why governmental
intervention is necessary.
The analytical procedures for searching out meaning are
well established.1 Courts "look first, of course, to the statutory
language, particularly to the provisions made therein. Then
we review the legislative history and other traditional aids of
statutory interpretation to determine congressional intent."2
They " 'must not be guided by a single sentence or member of
a sentence, but look to the provisions of the whole law, and to
its object and policy.' "'
"Legislation," said Justice Frankfurter:
[H]as an aim; it seeks to obviate some mischief, to supply
an inadequacy, to effect a change of policy, to formulate a
plan of government. That aim, that policy is not drawn,
like nitrogen, out of the air; it is evinced in the language
of the statute, as read in the light of other external mani-
festations of purpose. That is what the judge must seek
and effectuate . . ..
How judges "seek and effectuate" their reading of a statute is
a complex issue. Language is multi-layered and carries many
kinds of signals. Any one word may suggest different mean-
ings for different readers. Lawmakers' decision to prefer one
word or phrase to another is not just some incidental or pro-
saic fact, but instead constitutes significant and consequential
evidence in determining what they mean.
The public's perception of the environment and its de-
mands on lawmakers has undergone a change over the past
1. Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S.
1, 13 (1981).
2. Id.; cf. K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281 (1988) (court considers
language and design of the statute as a whole).
3. Mastro Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 350 U.S. 270, 285 (1956) (quoting United
States v. Boidore's Heirs, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 113, 122, (1850)). See also, United States
v. Hell's Canyon Guide Serv., 660 F.2d 735, 737 (9th Cir. 1981) (when a statute "is
part of an organic whole, the statute should be viewed in context with the whole of
which it is a part").
4. F. FRANKFURTER, The Reading of Statutes, in OF LAW AND MEN 60 (1956).
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seventy-five years. It was only in 1969, in the National Envi-
ronmental Policy Act (NEPA),5 that Congress first officially
recognized the "profound impact of man's activity on the in-
terrelations of all components of the natural environment."
The following year Congress more openly declared that "man
has caused changes in the environment."'7 Congress found that
the changes were attributable to industrial expansion, popula-
tion growth, new and expanding technological advances, and
high-density urbanization.' Identifying "man" as the cause of
changes suggested an entirely new approach to the issue of
environmental degradation. It was recognized that the envi-
ronment does not have unlimited capacity.,
Since NEPA, Congress and state legislatures have
burnished their voices into environmental laws with particu-
larly strong and cogent language. The laws employ their own
distinctive rhetoric. The public was becoming alarmed in the
early 1960s, and began to make demands of its elected repre-
sentatives. Statutory language (then and now) is demonstrable
evidence that legislators felt and feel powerfully about the en-
vironment, and that they are doing more than paying lip-
service.
Environmental laws convey an urgent message to pol-
luters and enforcers, urging them to take the environment
into account as part of short- and long-term planning, in both
the public and private sectors. 10 Lawmakers make choices to
5. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370b (1988).
6. Id. § 4331(a).
7. Environmental Quality Improvement Act of 1970, 42 U.S.C. § 4371(a)(1)
(1988).
8. Id. §§ 4331(a), 4371(a)(3).
9. See S. REP. No. 296, 91st Cong., Ist Sess. 4, reprinted in 1969 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADMIN. NEWS 2751. The costs of past neglect of environmental crises "can no longer
be deferred for payment by future generations, [because] [w]e no longer have the
margins for error that we once enjoyed." Id. at 5.
10. An example of this urgency are the concerns expressed in the Global Change
Research Act of 1990, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2921-2961 (Supp. 1991). Among the "findings" are
the following:
(1) Industrial, agricultural, and other human activities, coupled with an
expanding world population, are contributing to processes of global change
that may significantly alter the Earth habitat within a few human
generations.
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express attitudes and expectations. The urgency expressed in
environmental laws reveals itself through language and organ-
ization. Although environmental laws expressly announce
public expectations of public and private acts, the large num-
ber of legal actions indicates that the duties and liabilities
they impose either are not entirely clear, or are not well
understood.
B. Tone and Attitude
Environmental statutes set forth the law in its technical
aspects, but also explicitly or implicitly convey information
about attitudes, expectations, etc., and reveal a moral pur-
pose. Legislators choose their language with deliberation and
develop their material for specific ends.
Even if a reader is unaware of the techniques that deliver
attitudes, he or she can still be receptive to the attitude itself.
Awareness of attitudes aids the interpretation of statutes and
persuades the reader of the seriousness of its message. Tone
and attitude are created through language. Tone designates
attitudes implied in a communication. If a writer means to be
stern and uncompromising, he shades his language to make
that attitude clear. Statutes which grant no defenses to an act,
or provide no coercive measures, must be regarded as being
qualitatively different from those that do.
There is a tonal difference between the laws of environ-
mental protection and the earlier laws of conservation. The
language of early conservation laws was essentially passive
and nonconfrontational, reflecting their limited scopes." Non-
(2) Such human-induced changes, in conjunction with natural fluctua-
tions, may lead to significant global warming and thus alter world climate
patterns and increase global sea levels. Over the next century, these conse-
quences could adversely affect world agricultural and marine production,
coastal habitability, biological diversity, human health, and global economic
and social well-being.
Id. § 2931(a).
11. In the absence of laws of environmental protection, the federal government
turned in the 1960s to the Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act of 1899, 33 U.S.C.
§§ 401-467e (1986), to help the government prosecute polluters. Although this law
was essentially dedicated to protecting navigation, one of its sections, called the Re-
fuse Act, forbade the discharge of refuse into navigable waters. Id. §§ 441-454 (1986).
1991]
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confrontational language suggests a willingness to accommo-
date, hence it is perceived as neutral to passive. In the way in
which the earlier laws were couched, they assumed people
would obey the laws because they ought to.
In contrast, NEPA and subsequent laws approach the
problem in a new way. They decree actual government inter-
vention, in language which is at once assertive and uncompro-
mising. This approach assumes that people act first for their
self-interest and not for the common good. They are com-
pelled to act responsibly, under the threat and certitude of
enforcement and imposition of penalties. Parties whose ac-
tions affect the environment are put on the defensive by mod-
ern environmental law, something that the earlier laws failed
to do. NEPA provides that "each person has a responsibility
to contribute to the preservation and enhancement of the en-
vironment."" The statute then includes the means to achieve
the stated goal. "Person" is not defined in NEPA, but in sub-
sequent laws Congress made it clear that the term embraces
individuals, private and public entities, governmental agen-
cies, etc.
While the earlier conservation laws incorporated preca-
tory language,"3 they were not supported by coercive and pu-
nitive measures. They also were not as direct and explicit
about "human-induced changes" to the environment and their
12. 42 U.S.C. § 4331(c).
13. Major conservation legislation includes the National Park Service Organic
Act of 1916, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1-18(0 (1988). It directs the National Park Services to con-
serve the scenery, the natural and historic objects, and the wildlife in national parks
"in such manner and by such means as will leave them unimpaired for the enjoyment
of future generations." Id. § 1.
Between 1920 and 1948, there was a scattering of acts. The Federal Power Act of
1920, 16 U.S.C. §§ 791-824 (1988), is designed to promote the comprehensive develop-
ment of the use of water for power purposes. See id. § 797 (1988). The Act specifically
requires that any license issued under it shall provide for "adequate protections, miti-
gation, and enhancement of fish and wildlife (including related spawning grounds and
habitat), and for other beneficial public uses ...." Id. § 803(a)(1).
The Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act of 1934, 16 U.S.C. §§ 661-666(c)(1988),
declares that wildlife conservation is to receive equal consideration with other fea-
tures of water resource development programs. Id. at § 661.
The precatory language apart, the statutory provisions are not coercive.
[Vol. 8
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consequences. 4 The absence of mutually supporting features
suggests an entirely different legislative attitude.
When the various features are combined in an integrated
text, they give environmental laws a new imperative force.
People are put on notice that they ignore or discount the risk
of enforcement and punishment at their peril. Prayers stand-
ing alone yield a different interpretion from prayers supported
by coercive and punitive measures. The absence of coercive
and punitive measures lessens the force of the prayers. Preca-
tory language alone was never a sufficient basis for liability
and punishment.
The evolution in approach from purely conservation laws
to laws of environmental protection is exemplified by changes
in language and approach. Environmental laws evidence a
shift away from laissez faire business practices, characteristic
of the earlier conservation laws, to interventionism. Environ-
mental laws: A) demand that affected parties act responsibly;
B) authorize intervention; C) prescribe substantial penalties
for non-compliance; D) encourage preventive planning; E) cre-
ate financial and evidentiary burdens; and F) compel parties
to voluntary action.
Statutes are special both in what they communicate and
how they communicate. They say much in a small compass
and frequently mean more than they appear to say. The
words in compressed communications, whether in poetry or
law, carry a greater than usual burden of meaning. Literal
readings produce alternative meanings, and the resulting dis-
putes become grist for the judicial mill.
II. Discovering Legislative Intention
A. Intention Expressed in Statutory Text
Intention and expectation are expressed or conspicuously
implicit in every part of a statutory text, and every part of the
text must be considered evidence of meaning. Interpretation
involves the marshaling of evidence for express commands, if
they are there, or for implied commands, if tone, attitude, and
14. Global Change Research Act of 1990, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2921-2961 (Supp. 1991).
1991]
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policy support such a reading. What the legislature is saying,
and how it is saying it, answers the fundamental questions of
responsibility and liability. Interpretation determines whether
a "person" (which under the Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) is a
globally defined term) will have liability or not. 15
Attitudes implicit in statutes, or expressed in lawmakers'
contemporaneous statements, significantly influence how
courts read statutes. When a court holds that, although Con-
gress did not specifically address an issue, it nevertheless in-
tended a particular result, 6 it makes a choice that has both
financial and moral implications.
Environmental statutes have several conjunctively oper-
ating components: prefaces (not all statutes), definitions, ju-
risdictional statements, and law. Where they are present,
prefaces are typically legislative "findings," "declarations,"
and "purpose," and are typically written in precatory lan-
guage. Prefaces also make it clear what is at stake.17 The law
component consists of proscriptions/prescriptions, penalties,
rights, and remedies. Persons who administer the law, and
those affected by it, want to know what statutes require, how
responsibilities are distributed, and how liability is
determined.
The definitions component, in essence a lexicon, serves
15. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (Supp. 1991). The environmental laws are extraordi-
nary in reach. No person is exempt from regulation or free from administrative atten-
tion. Under CERCLA, the term "person" embraces the universe of actors, govern-
mental and private, who contributed to the deterioration of the environment. "The
term 'Person' means an individual, firm, corporation, association, partnership, consor-
tium, joint venture, commercial entity, United States Government, State, municipal-
ity, commission, political subdivision of a State, or any interstate body." Id. §
9601(21). The term "individual" has been found to include officers, directors, manag-
ers, and shareholders of corporations.
16. Louisiana-Pacific Corp. v. ASARCO, Inc., 909 F.2d 1260, 1262 (9th Cir. 1990)
("Preliminarily, we must decide whether there is successor liability under CERCLA.
Although Congress failed to address specifically the issue of corporate successor lia-
bility in CERCLA, we . . . hold that Congress did intend successor liability.").
17. Global Change Research Act of 1990, 15 U.S.C. § 2931(a)(3) (Supp. 1991).
"The release of chlorofluorocarbons and other stratospheric ozone-depleting sub-
stances is rapidly reducing the ability of the atmosphere to screen out harmful ultra-
violet radiation, which could adversely affect human health and ecological systems."
[Vol. 8
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two purposes: it educates the reader to the specialized mean-
ings which the statute uses, which do not necessarily corre-
spond with definitions in standard dictionaries, and it pro-
motes statutory self-containment - that is, the statute itself
provides sufficient information to the reader to make it unnec-
essary for him to go outside the statute to understand its
meaning. Courts typically say that the language of a statute
ordinarily is conclusive "[a]bsent a clearly expressed legisla-
tive intention to the contrary."'18
Words included in definitions run the gamut. Under
CERCLA, for example, the term "barrel" means forty-two
United States gallons at sixty degrees Fahrenheit.1 9 "Adminis-
trator" is the Administrator of the United States Environ-
mental Protection Agency.2 But the lexicon also includes the
measurable and tangible, such as "contaminant"'" and
"animal";22 the abstract, such as "significantly"; 3 and the
non-quantifiable, such as "taking,"'" Two terms are indispen-
sable to understanding the meaning of environmental stat-
utes: "environment" and "liability."
B. Defining Environment
The national policy is to "encourage productive and en-
joyable harmony between man and his environment. 2 5 In the
18. Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 108
(1980).
19. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(3).
20. Id. § 9601(2).
21. "Contaminant", as defined in the Safe Drinking Water Act, means "any
physical, chemical, biological, or radiological substance or matter in water." 42 U.S.C.
§ 300(f)(6)(1988).
22. "Animal" is defined as "all vertebrate and invertebrate species, including but
not limited to man and other mammals, birds, fish, and shellfish." Federal, Insecti-
cide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA), 7 U.S.C. § 136(d)(1988).
23. Council on Environmental Quality, 40 C.F.R. § 1508.27 (1990).
24. The term "take," as defined in the Endangered Species Act, means "harass,
harm, pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect, or to attempt to en-
gage in any such conduct." 16 U.S.C. § 1532(19)(1988); see S. REP. No. 307, 93d Cong.,
1st Sess. 7, reprinted in 1973 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2989, 2995 (" 'Take' is
defined . . . in the broadest possible manner to include every conceivable way in
which a person can 'take' or attempt to 'take' any fish or wildlife").
25. 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (1988)(Congressional declaration of purpose in NEPA).
1991]
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regulations promulgated by the Council on Environmental
Quality (CEQ) (established under NEPA), "human environ-
ment" is defined "comprehensively to include the natural and
physical environment and the relationship of people with that
environment."26
Words are like organisms which carry the code of their
origins even as they mature and expand in meaning and nu-
ance. The word "environment" has a range of meanings today,
but when it was first employed, its meaning was limited to
locality. Today, particularly when it is preceded by the article
"the," "environment" usually signifies the larger rather than
the smaller - regional, even global - rather than local. Sub-
stituting an adjective for the article, such as "home" or
"workplace," the word "environment" can also describe small
areas.2 7 Nevertheless, when the subject is the environment,
one thinks first of nature,2 8 of the interactive ecological sys-
tems and the biosphere. The environment that the laws seek
to protect is that which is physically encompassing.
The word "environment" is an import into English from
old French. The Oxford English Dictionary (OED) records the
first use of the word in the thirteenth century.2 9 The word has
two components: en ("in") and viron ("neighborhood"). Envi-
ron still carries its original meaning, "in the neighborhood or
round about," as in "environs" (surrounding district of a
town). It was later expanded to include the "region surround-
ing anything." The OED notes the first use of "environment"
in this sense in 1830, in a work by Thomas Carlyle.30
26. Council on Environmental Quality, 40 C.F.R. § 1508.14 (1990). An Environ-
mental Impact Statement (EIS) is required under NEPA when a proposed Federal
action will affect the quality of the "human environment." 42 U.S.C. § 4332. This has
been interpreted to be limited to effects on the natural or physical environment. See
Image of Greater San Antonio v. Brown, 570 F.2d 517 (5th Cir. 1978); Breckinridge v.
Rumsfeld, 537 F.2d 864 (6th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1061 (1977).
27. The "workplace" environment is the concern of the Occupational Safety and
Health Act, 29 U.S.C. § 651 (1988).
28. The word "nature" shares a common base with gnasci signifying "begin-
ning, "giving birth". L. THOMAS, On Various Words, in A LONG LINE OF CELLS 100
(1990).
29. 5 THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 315 (2d ed. 1989).
30. Id.
[Vol. 8
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According to the OED, "environment" retained its local
meaning and added other senses, including reference to the
soil and the air (as used by Herbert Spencer in a work dating
from 1855).31 "Environment" seems to have become increas-
ingly inclusive as the pace of communications accelerated. Ac-
celeration created the impression that the world was dimin-
ishing, and this fostered a realization that the symbiotic
relationship among all living things pays no attention to polit-
ical or geographical boundaries.2
From the limited sense of "around about," "environ-
ment" has come to mean "surrounds ' 33 in the sense of every
part of their physical surroundings that humans know. The
federal laws tend to define environment in the larger sense.
For example, under CERCLA, "environment" means "(A) the
navigable waters, the waters of the contiguous zone, and the
ocean waters . . . and (B) any other surface water, ground
water, drinking water supply, land surface or subsurface
strata, or ambient air within the United States or under the
jurisdiction of the United States." 4 The Toxic Substances
Control Act (TSCA) 5 and the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide,
and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA)3 define "environment" as in-
cluding "water, air, and land and the interrelationship which
exists among and between water, air, and land and all living
things.3-7
How broadly the term "environment" is construed has
been answered by courts in a variety of ways. One answer was
given by the United States Supreme Court in an action under
NEPA, which involved restarting a nuclear power plant at
Three Mile Island after another plant at the same location
suffered a meltdown.38 An association of residents contended
31. Id.
32. See, The Queen ex rel. Ontario v. United States EPA, 912 F.2d 1525 (D.C.
Cir. 1990).
33. 5 THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 315.
34. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(8).
35. 15 U.S.C. §2 2601-2671 (1988).
36. 7 U.S.C. 2§ 136-136y (1988).
37. § 3(5), 15 U.S.C. § 2602(5) (1988); § 2(j), 7 U.S.C. § 136(j) (1988).
38. People Against Nuclear Energy v. United States Nuclear Regulatory
Comm'n, 678 F.2d 222 (D.C. Cir. 1982), rev'd sub nom. Metropolitan Edison Co. v.
1991]
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that restarting the plant would cause both severe damage to
the psychological health of persons living in the vicinity, and
serious damage to the stability, cohesiveness, and well-being
of the neighboring communities. The Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (NRC) decided that it would not take evidence
on the issue - that is, it would not consider whether the ap-
proval that was being sought was an action which would sig-
nificantly affect the quality of the human environment - and
the association brought suit.
The association was successful in the court of appeals,
which held that the NRC improperly failed to consider
whether the risk of an accident might cause harm to the psy-
chological health of the surrounding area.3 9 This conclusion
implied that psychological health came within the ambit of
NEPA and was an appropriate subject for study. The Su-
preme Court disagreed and held that NEPA does not require
an agency to assess every impact or effect of its proposed ac-
tion, but only the impact or effect on the environment. In the
opinion of Justice Rehnquist, "[i]f we were to seize the word
'environmental' out of its context and give it the broadest pos-
sible definition, the words 'adverse environmental effects'
might embrace virtually any consequence of a governmental
action that someone thought 'adverse.'"40 The Chief Justice
continued, "[b]ut we think the context of the statute shows
that Congress was talking about the physical environment -
the world around us, so to speak. NEPA was designed to pro-
mote human welfare by alerting governmental actors to the
effect of their proposed actions on the physical
environment.""'
Similarly, purely economic interests are not within the
"zone of interest protected by NEPA," unless they are inter-
People Against Nuclear Energy, 460 U.S. 766 (1983).
39. People Against Nuclear Energy, 678 F.2d at 228. Since "NEPA was designed
to 'promote efforts which will prevent or eliminate damage to the environment and
biosphere and stimulate the health and welfare of man,'" in the context of NEPA,
health encompasses psychological health. Id. at 227 (emphasis added).
40. Metropolitan Edison Co. v. People Against Nuclear Energy, 460 U.S. 760,
772.
41. Id.
[Vol. 8
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related with environmental effects. If there is such an interre-
lation, courts have concluded that all significant effects on the
human environment should be considered by the decision
maker.'2
State and local laws define environment in both the large
and smaller senses. In New York law, "environment" is de-
fined in the State Environmental Quality Review Act
(SEQRA),' s New York City's Environmental Quality Review
Procedure Act (CEQR)," and the New York State Parks, Rec-
reation and Historic Preservation Law (PRHPL). s In SEQRA
and CEQR, environment includes "objects of historic or aes-
thetic significance, existing patterns of population concentra-
tion, distribution, or growth, and existing community or
neighborhood character."' 46 In the PRHPL, environment or
"environmental asset" includes "the historical, archeological,
architectural and cultural heritage of the state." '47 The Decla-
ration of Policy in the PRHPL finds that, "[tihe existence of
irreplaceable properties of historical, archeological, architec-
tural and cultural significance is threatened by the forces of
change."'"4 The phrase "forces of change," reminiscent of the
Environmental Quality Improvement Act, does not otherwise
appear in New York law.
Invocation of local meaning is illustrated in cases arising
out of development in urban- areas.49 In Chinese Staff &
42. See Highland Coop. v. City of Lansing, 492 F. Supp. 1372, 1378 (W.D. Mich.
1980) ("most courts will review the agency's threshold decision only where the plain-
tiff raises 'substantial environmental issues' ").
43. N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW §§ 8-0101 (McKinney 1984). Governor Carey
noted in his approval memorandum that the bill was modeled after NEPA. 1975 N.Y.
LAWS 1761-62 (Governor's Approval Memorandum). The purpose of the act is "to
promote efforts which will prevent or eliminate damage to the environment and en-
hance human and community resources; and to enrich the understanding of the eco-
logical systems, natural, human and community resources important to the people of
the state." Id.
44. New York, N.Y., Exec. Order 91 (1977).
45. N.Y. PARKS, REC. & HIST. PREs. LAW § 14.01 (McKinney 1984).
46. N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERv. LAW § 8-0105(6) (McKinney 1984).
47. N.Y. PARKS, REc. & HIST. PREs. LAW § 14.01.
48. Id.
49. Some federal courts have recognized that NEPA review encompasses in the
urban setting the quality of urban life. See Hanly v. Mitchell, 460 F.2d 640 (2d Cir.
1991]
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Workers Ass'n v. City of New York, 50 residents challenged the
actions of the New York City Planning Commission and the
Board of Estimates in approving a special permit for con-
struction of a proposed high-rise luxury condominium on a
vacant lot in their community.5 1 Both city and state laws re-
quire lead agencies to consider the short- and long-term pri-
mary and secondary effects of a proposed action.
The approval for the proposed development plan in the
Chinatown section of New York City was annulled because
the lead agency did not consider the potential effects on the
surrounding community. The court held that "the impact that
a project may have on population patterns or existing commu-
nity character, with or without a separate impact on the phys-
ical environment, is a relevant concern in an environmental
analysis since, the statute includes these concerns as elements
of the environment. 52
Whichever "environment" is protected, the courts strictly
construe the requirement that environmental factors are to be
considered equally with other, more traditional concerns.5
C. Defining Liability
Congress made a choice in fashioning CERCLA when it
determined that liability attaches regardless of whether an af-
1972); Hanly v. Kleindienst, 471 F.2d 823 (2d Cir. 1972).
50. 68 N.Y.2d 359, 502 N.E.2d 176, 509 N.Y.S.2d 499 (1986).
51. Id. at 362, 502 N.E.2d at 177-78, 509 N.Y.S.2d at 500-01.
52. Id. at 366, 502 N.E.2d at 180, 509 N.Y.S.2d at 503. Cf. Laurel Heights Im-
provement Ass'n v. Regents of the Univ. of California, 47 Cal. 3d 376, 764 P.2d 278,
253 Cal. Rptr. 426 (1988), as modified on denial of rehearing, 205 Cal. App. 3d 354,
238 Cal. Rptr. 451 (1989).
53. Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. Atomic Energy Comm'n, 449 F.2d
1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971). See also Natural Resources Defense Council v. Texaco, 906
F.2d 934 (3rd Cir. 1990). In Texaco, the district court presumed that the mere fact of
statutory violation warranted relief and enjoined Texaco from violating its pollutant
discharge permit. In vacating the injunction and remanding the issue, the Third Cir-
cuit held that the court must apply traditional equitable standards and should not
presume irreparable injury. Id. at 941. However, the court stated, "(W]e do recognize,
and so advise the district court on remand, that . . . [e]nvironmental injury, by its
nature, can seldom be adequately remedied by money damages and is often perma-
nent or at least of long duration [and is often] irreparable." Id. (quoting Amoco Prod.
Co. v. Village of Gambell, 480 U.S. 531, 545 (1987)).
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fected party is blameworthy.5' The terms "liable" and "liabil-
ity"56 are defined by reference to section 311 of the Clean
Water Act.56 The standard of liability under section 311 has
been construed to be strict.5 7 Liability strictly construed in-
cludes almost any permutation of liability. Three examples
will suffice. The first example is from CERCLA, the second
and third are from RCRA.
In order to reach corporate officers and directors, courts
have taken several different, sometimes circuitous routes in
order to find liability. In one leading case, the court first con-
sidered the definition of "owner or operator" contained in
CERCLA's lexicon and found that it meant "any person own-
ing or operating" an onshore facility.5 It then looked up the
definition of person in the same lexicon, which it found in-
cludes individuals as well as corporations. 9 From this internal
evidence, the court reasoned:
More important, the definition of "owner or operator" ex-
cludes "a person, who, without participating in the man-
agement of a ... facility, holds indicia of ownership pri-
marily to protect his security interest in the facility." [42
U.S.C.] § 9601(20)(A). The use of this exception implies
that an owning stockholder who manages the corpora-
54. The original House version of the bill imposed liability on "any person who
caused or contributed to the release or threatened release..." H.R. REP. No. 1016,
96th Cong., 2d Sess. 33, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS, 6119,
6136. The House Committee Report accompanying the House bill noted that "for
liability to attach ... the plaintiff must demonstrate a causal or contributory nexus
between the acts of the defendant and the conditions which necessitated response
action ... " Id. at 6136-37.
In its final version, owners and operators are liable without regard to fault or
causation, and they cannot assert statute of limitations or contractual indemnification
as a defense to any governmental action. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)-(b).
In contrast, New York made a different choice. The law provides that a person's
"responsibility" for cleaning up contaminated property is to be determined "accord-
ing to applicable principles of statutory or common law liability." N.Y. ENVTL. CON-
SERV. LAW § 27-1313(4) (McKinney 1984).
55. CERCLA § 101(32), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(32)(1988).
56. 33 U.S.C. § 1321 (1988).
57. Steuart Transp. Co. v. Allied Towing Corp., 596 F.2d 609, 613 (4th Cir. 1979).
58. New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1052 (2d Cir. 1984).
59. Id.
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tion, such as LeoGrande, is liable under CERCLA as an
"owner or operator."6
The court found liability by implication. Other courts have
pursued different routes and reached the same conclusion. 1
The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA)
provides that the wastes regulated by the statute do "not in-
clude solid or dissolved material in domestic sewage." 2 In
Comite Pro Rescate de la Salud v. Puerto Rico Aqueduct and
Sewer Auth., 3 the court was asked to determine whether fac-
tory wastes that mix with sewage emanating from bathrooms
at factory workplaces are exempt from the application of
RCRA. Defendants owned factories within a large industrial
park. Sewer lines connected the plants to a major, privately
owned sewer line, which in turn connected with a publicly
owned sewer line that ran outside the park to a publicly
owned sewage treatment plant.
The court, in rejecting defendants' interpretation of the
statute, held:
First, the word "domestic" (coming from the Latin
"domus" or "house") in ordinary English means "relating
to the household or the family . . . connected with the
supply, service, and activities of households and private
residences." Webster's Third New International Diction-
ary 671 (1976). Following the Supreme Court, "we assume
that the legislative purpose is expressed by the ordinary
meaning of the words used."
Second, the statutory provision defines "solid waste,"
not simply in terms of type of material, but also in terms
of source. Thus, it speaks of material "resulting from in-
dustrial, commercial, mining .... agricultural ... and ...
community" operations and activities and then contrasts
"domestic" sewage. In context, exempt "domestic sewage"
therefore seems to refer, not simply to type, but also to
60. Id. (emphasis added).
61. See infra note 128 and accompanying text.
62. 42 U.S.C. § 6903(27) (1988).
63. 888 F.2d 180 (1st Cir. 1989).
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source.6 4
Thus, the court held the fact that when "domestic sewage"
mixes with factory waste, the latter is not elevated to the ex-
empt category. As in other instances, unless there is an ex-
press command to the contrary, courts tend to interpret the
law strictly in favor of protection, by giving the statute an in-
terpretation consistent with the attitudes expressed and the
general object and purpose of the legislation.
It has already been observed that culpability is not the
sole predicate for liability. Not every person liable under a
statute (CERCLA) caused or created the condition for which
liability attaches. For the most part, however, where emissions
(Clean Air Act) or effluvia (Clean Water Act, RCRA) exceed
the standard, there is a direct causal connection between the
activities of a person and liability. If "A" causes harm to the
environment, "A" is the target of the legislation and is an-
swerable in penalties and damages. Failure to comply with
protective requirements is prima facie evidence of violation.
In Ecodyne Corp. v. Shah,6 5 the dispute concerned who would
ultimately bear the cost of cleaning up groundwater and soil
polluted by chromium. It was undisputed that the plaintiff,
who was seeking contribution from subsequent owners of the
property, introduced the pollutant to the environment during
the time it owned the property."6 Plaintiff's theory was that
subsequent owners were nonetheless liable because the gen-
eral movement and migration of the chromium constituted a
"disposal" as that term is defined in the statute.6 If this were
true, then defendants would not be able to escape liability
even though they had not caused the condition. 8
The term "disposal" means:
[T]he discharge, deposit, injection, dumping, spilling,
leaking, or placing of any solid waste or hazardous waste
64. Id. at 184-85 (citations omitted).
65. 718 F. Supp. 1454 (N.D. Cal. 1989).
66. Id. at 1455.
67. Id. at 1457.
68. Id.
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into or on any land or water so that such solid waste or
hazardous waste or any constituent thereof may enter the
environment or be emitted into the air or discharged into
any ground waters.s9
In arguing that the general movement and migration of
the chromium constituted a disposal, plaintiff primarily fo-
cused on the words "discharge" and "leaking."'70 The court
was not impressed. However broad Congress may have in-
tended the definition, plaintiff's interpretation distorted Con-
gressional intent." Therefore, the court stated "[tihe meaning
of a word is or may be known from the accompanying
words-this is the principle of noscitur a sociis.' 7 2 "Noscitur
a sociis" means known by its associates. 7 s The court
continued:
In ascertaining what disposal means, the court looks at its
definitional components and finds that these three nouns
(discharge, deposit, and injection) and four gerunds
(dumping, spilling, leaking, and placing), when read to-
gether, all have in common the idea that someone do
something with hazardous substances. Taking the clearest
example, the court notes that "placing," read in the con-
text of the statute, means a person introduc-
ing-putting-formerly controlled or contained hazardous
substances into the environment.74
The court concluded, "for plaintiff solipsistically to read,
for example, 'leaking' as meaning the general migration of
chemicals and, as such, a disposal under [the statute] renders
not only the definitional phrases . . . 'into or on any land or
water' superfluous, but would also conflict with the general
69. 42 U.S.C. § 6903(3).
70. Ecodyne Corp., 718 F. Supp. at 1456.
71. Id. at 1457. "However broad Congress may have intended the definition,
Congressional intent does not justify the distortion [of] the statute. Therefore, in-
stead of relying on legislative history (an exercise unnecessary in this case), the Court
will apply sound principles of statutory and grammatical interpretation." Id.
72. Id.
73. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1060 (6th ed. 1990).
74. Ecodyne Corp., 718 F. Supp. at 1457.
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structure of [the provision].
In a government suit, a prior owner who caused or con-
tributed to a hazardous condition cannot escape liability by
the mere fact of its having conveyed property to a subsequent
owner. A subsequent owner, albeit "innocent" of having re-
leased pollutants into the environment, is no less liable for the
condition, even if not culpable. "Innocent" does not mean
that a party can escape liability to the government. Their
remedy in the event of a governmental action is to look back
in the chain of title for indemnification or contribution from
prior owners and operators, whichever applies. 6
III. Institutionalizing Responsibility and Accountability
The manner in which responsibilities and liabilities are
distributed has both moral and financial implications. The at-
titude toward responsibility is conspicuously apparent in in-
troductory statutory provisions entitled "Findings" and "Dec-
larations." The precatory language and plain speaking
concerns of these provisions set a tone, an expectation. Find-
ings and declarations combine the concrete and scientific with
the abstract and the emotive to express the scope of the laws
and the depth of public commitment. They establish a basic
set of values both by the facts which they present and the
tone of presentation.
The environmental laws opt for particularized responsi-
bility. They do this by institutionalizing responsiveness and
responsibility. It has already been suggested that the environ-
mental laws put the regulated community as well as enforce-
ment personnel on the defensive. Persons whose activities af-
fect the environment are compelled to account for their
actions and to regard protection as a primary rather than an
incidental element of planning."
75. Id.
76. Levine, Spreading Costs for Cleaning up Contaminated Property: Contribu-
tion and Indemnification under CERCLA, N.Y.S.B.J. July-Aug. 1991, 41, 42.
77. See United States v. Cannons Eng'g Corp., 899 F.2d 79 (lst Cir. 1990). The
court's attitude toward non-cooperative potentially responsible parties (PRPs) is par-
ticularly relevant: "Crown argues that it was unfairly subjected to a double penalty
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These findings and declarations are intended to be read
into the subsequent provisions and to promote appreciation
for the environment. For example, the legislature's declaration
in NEPA that its purpose is to "create and maintain condi-
tions under which man and nature can exist in productive
harmony" expresses the implicit concern that certain condi-
tions are not conducive to productive harmony.78
NEPA states it is the "responsibility of each person to
contribute to the preservation and enhancement of the envi-
ronment. '7 9 If each person has a "responsibility," then no per-
son can claim that he is exempt, or can excuse behavior which
is not responsible. A degraded environment is an unhealthy
environment. An unhealthy environment is a breach of trust.
Environmental laws seek to remedy past abuses and to pre-
vent future ones. Responsibility connotes accountability; the
ability to fulfill an obligation or trust. Implicit in this meaning
is the sense of liability for the failure to fulfill expectations.
Environmental laws are based on these explicit and implicit
assumptions.
Responsibility is inferred from expectation. In the confer-
ence report which followed the reconciliation of the House
and Senate bills for the Hazardous and Solid Waste Amend-
ments of 1984,80 the conferees stated that the law was "in-
tend[ed] to convey a clear and unambiguous message to the
regulated community and the Environmental Protection
Agency" with respect to land disposal of hazardous waste:
Conferees intend that through the vigorous implementa-
tion of the objectives of this Act, land disposal will be
eliminated for many wastes and minimized for all others,
and that advanced treatment, recycling, incineration and
other hazardous waste control technologies should replace
land disposal. In other words, land disposal should be
used only as a last resort and only under conditions
because withholding the information resulted both in its exclusion from the settle-
ments and in the imposition of bad-faith penalties. We see nothing amiss." Id. at 93.
78. 42 U.S.C. § 4331(a).
79. 42 U.S.C. § 4331(c).
80. Pub. L. No. 98-616, 98 Stat. 3221 (1984).
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which are fully protective of human health and the
environment.81
These intentions were expressed under the heading "Con-
gressional Findings" in RCRA. 2 One of the four Findings an-
nounces that there is a "rising tide of scrap, discarded and
waste materials." 83 The Finding reads:
[T]he economic and population growth of our Nation, and
the improvements in the standard of living enjoyed by
our population, have required increased industrial pro-
duction to meet our needs, and have made necessary the
demolition of old buildings, the construction of new
buildings, and the provision of highways and other ave-
nues of transportation, which, together with related in-
dustrial, commercial, and agricultural operations, have re-
sulted in a rising tide of scrap, discarded, and waste
materials."
In the same provision, under the heading "Environment and
Health," Congress found that:
(1) although land is too valuable a national resource to be
needlessly polluted by discarded materials, most solid
waste is disposed of on land in open dumps and sanitary
landfills; [and]
(2) disposal of solid waste and hazardous waste in or on
the land without careful planning and management can
present a danger to human health and the environment.8
81. H.R. REP. No. 1133, 98th Cong. 79, 80-81, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADMIN. NEWS 5576, 5651 (emphasis added).
82. 42 U.S.C. § 6901. As originally enacted, RCRA "did not require permittees to
take significant remedial action to correct past mismanagement of hazardous waste."
United Technologies Corp. v. United States EPA, 821 F.2d 714, 717 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
In 1984, Congress decisively changed that focus with the Hazardous and Solid
Waste Amendments (HSWA), Pub. L. No. 98-616, 98 Stat. 3221 (1984). This Amend-
ment greatly increased the authority of the Environmental Protection Agency to re-
quire corrective action, even for releases that occurred before HSWA was enacted.
83. 42 U.S.C. § 6901(a)(2).
84. Id.
85. Id. § 6901(b).
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Consequently, of the eleven objectives of RCRA, one prohibits
"future open dumping on the land" and another requires that
"hazardous waste be properly managed in the first instance
thereby reducing the need for corrective action at a future
date.""'
Similar concerns for improving the quality of the environ-
ment are expressed in the Clean Air Act8 7 (subsequently much
amended, most recently in the 101st Congress). In the Clean
Air Act, Congress found that:
The growth in the amount and complexity of air pollution
brought about by urbanization, industrial development,
and the increasing use of motor vehicles, has resulted in
mounting dangers to the public health and welfare, in-
cluding injury to agricultural crops and livestock, damage
to and the deterioration of property, and hazards to air
and ground transportations."
The Clean Water Act e is even more ambitious because it
aims to have international influence as well as national effec-
tiveness. Nationally, the objective is "to restore and maintain
the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation's
waters." 90 The international objective, according to the Con-
gressional policy statement, is:
That to the fullest extent possible all foreign countries
shall take meaningful action for the prevention, reduc-
tion, and elimination of pollution in their waters and in
international waters and for the achievement of goals re-
garding the elimination of discharge of pollutants and the
86. Id. §§ 6902(a)(3) and (5). RCRA permits both the federal government and
private citizens to ask a court for injunctive relief against any person connected with
the handling, storage, treatment or disposal of "any solid waste or hazardous waste
[which] may present an imminent and substantial endangerment to health or the
environment." Id. § 6973(a) (authorizing administrator to bring suit); Id. §
6972(a)(1)(B) (authorizing citizens' suits to enforce the "imminent and substantial
endangerment" provision).
87. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 (1988).
88. Id. § 7401(a)(2).
89. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1988).
90. Id. § 1251(a).
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improvement of water quality to at least the same extent
as the United States does under its laws.9 1
Other laws make specific reference to the countryside and
public park and recreation lands. For example, in the Depart-
ment of Transportation Act of 1966, Congress declared that it
is the "national policy that special effort should be made to
preserve the natural beauty of the countryside and public
park and recreation lands, wildlife and waterfowl refuges, and
historic sites. '92 Congress wrote the identical language into
the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1968.91
State constitutions are similarly broad. The point can be
made by quoting the language of the Constitutions of New
York and Michigan. The Constitution of the State of New
York reads, "the policy of the state shall be to conserve and
protect its natural resources." 94 The Constitution of the State
of Michigan reads, "the conservation and development of the
natural resources of the state are hereby declared to be of par-
amount public concern in the interest of the health, safety
and general welfare of the people."95
The general language of conservation in these Constitu-
tions acquire greater resonance by juxtaposition with the in-
terventionist language in particular environmental statutes
and regulations. Preambles to quality review statutes, in par-
ticular, set forth ideals which are introductory to the prescrip-
tive parts of the statutes. They establish a framework for all
actions that may have a significant effect on the environ-
ment.6 In the preamble to New York's statute, the Legisla-
ture recognizes that at all times the environment must be
"healthful and pleasing to the senses and intellect of man now
and in the future."'9 That language, and the use of words such
91. Id. § 1251(c).
92. 49 U.S.C. § 1653(f), repealed by Pub. L. No. 97-449 § 7(b), 96 Stat. 2444,
(Jan. 12, 1983).
93. 23 U.S.C. § 138 (1988).
94. N.Y. CONST. art. 14, § 4.
95. MICH. CONST. art. 4, § 52.
96. N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 8-0101 (McKinney 1984).
97. Id. § 8-0103(1).
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as "responsibility" and "obligation," emphasize the urgency of
the environmental issues.98 The statute declares that "[e]very
citizen has a responsibility to contribute to the preservation
and enhancement of the quality of the environment,"9 and
that government has an "obligation to protect the environ-
ment for the use and enjoyment of this and all future genera-
tions." 10 0 "Every citizen" is an inclusive group. 10 1 In its sweep
the term "citizen" equates with "person" as defined in RCRA
and CERCLA.
California's quality review law provides that the "mainte-
nance of a quality environment for the people ... now and in
the future is a matter of statewide concern."10' 2 It commands
that the environment be accorded the fullest possible protec-
tion consistent with the statutory language. 10 New York's in-
vocation is identical to California's in all material respects.10°
New York courts have been particularly insistent on strict and
literal compliance with statutory procedural requirements.
SEQRA requires literal compliance; substantial compliance is
not sufficient.1 05
In interpreting Washington State's environmental law,
the Supreme Court of Washington made it clear that the
"maintenance, enhancement and restoration of our environ-
ment is the pronounced policy of this state, deserving faithful
judicial interpretation."106 Under NEPA and state environ-
98. Id. § 8-0103(2), (8).
99. Id. § 8-0103(2).
100. Id. § 8-0103(8).
101. The statute addresses citizens who are applicants. The term "applicant"
means any person making an application ... to an agency to... grant an approval in
connection with a proposed action." N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 6 [hereinafter 6
N.Y.C.R.R.], § 617.2(d) (1987). The term "Person" means "any agency, individual,
corporation, governmental entity, partnership, association, trustee or other legal en-
tity." 6 N.Y.C.R.R. § 617.2(z) (1987).
102. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE, § 21,000(a) (West 1986).
103. Friends of Mammoth v. Board of Supervisors, 8 Cal. 3d 247, 259, 502 P.2d
1049, 1056, 104 Cal. Rptr. 761, 768 (1972).
104. ENVTL. CONSERv. LAW § 8-0103(1) (McKinney 1984).
105. Glen Head-Glenwood Civic Council, Inc. v. Town of Oyster Bay, 88 A.D.2d
484, 490-91, 453 N.Y.S.2d 732, 737 (2d Dep't 1982).
106. Eastlake Community Council v. Roanoke Assoc., 82 Wash. 2d 475, 513 P.2d
36, 46 (1973). "The 'continuing' policy and responsibility of the state is not only to
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mental quality review acts generally, lead agencies are not au-
thorized to vary the regulatory procedures by lightening the
burdens and responsibilities of either the applicant or
agency.107 The lead agencies cannot give final approvals until
they make findings that an action minimizes or avoids adverse
environmental effects. The national environmental policy is to
"attain the widest range of beneficial uses of the environment
without degradation, risk to health or safety, or other undesir-
able and unintended consequences.' 08 NEPA and state envi-
ronmental quality review acts require the sponsor to prepare
and circulate an environmental impact statement. Failure to
comply with this requirement supports denial of the applica-
tion for private sponsors'09 and remand for public sponsors. 110
To take only one state example, a typical directive is il-
lustrated by the regulations promulgated by the New York
State Department of Environmental Conservation. Under
New York law, the lead agency is required to find that the
"adverse environmental effects revealed in the environmental
impact statement process will be minimized or avoided by in-
corporating as conditions to the decision those mitigative
measures which were identified as practicable.""' If the mea-
sures are reasonable, that is, they relate to the impact sought
to be ameliorated, then the court will not disturb an agency's
maintain and enhance our environment, but also to 'prevent or eliminate damage to
the environment' and 'restore' it." Id. at 46 (emphasis in original).
107. See Schenectady Chemicals v. Flacke, 83 A.D.2d 460, 463, 446 N.Y.S.2d 418,
420 (3d Dep't 1981)(substance of SEQRA cannot be achieved without its procedure;
therefore, attempts by agencies to vary procedural prerequisites are not permitted
since such deviations undermine the law's express purposes); Rye Town/King Civic
Ass'n v. Town of Rye, 82 A.D.2d 474, 477; 442 N.Y.S.2d 67, 70 (2d Dep't 1981)(lead
agency failed to prepare EIS).
108. 42 U.S.C. § 4331, NEPA § 101(b)(3).
109. Glen Head v. Town of Oyster Bay, 88 A.D.2d at 490-91, 453 N.Y.S.2d at
737.
110. See Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Callaway, 524 F.2d 79, 94
(2d Cir. 1975). The court held, "[bly failing to present a complete analysis and com-
parison of the possible dumping sites, the Final EIS fails to perform its vital task of
exposing the reasoning and data of the agency proposing the action to scrutiny by the
public and by other branches of the government." Id. at 94.
111. 6 N.Y.C.R.R. § 617.9(c)(4) (1983).
1991]
25
PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW
decision to attach conditions."'
IV. Trustees, Guardians and Stewards
A. Moral Responsibility
The concept that the each generation has a moral respon-
sibility to succeeding generations for protecting the environ-
ment was undoubtedly thought before 1969, but it was not
formally expressed as public policy until the enactment of
The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA). 13
In that act, Congress declared that, "it is the continuing re-
sponsibility of the federal government to use all practicable
means, consistent with other essential considerations of na-
tional policy, to [ensure] .. .that the Nation may . . .fulfill
the responsibilities of each generation as trustee of the envi-
ronment for succeeding generations. 11 4 The Oxford English
Dictionary defines a "trustee" as "one who is held responsible
for the preservation and administration of anything."11 5 To
trust is to have confidence in or reliance on some quality or
attribute of a person. A trustee is a protector. Mini-NEPAs
(state NEPA equivalents), such as N.Y.'s SEQRA, declare
that agencies are "stewards of the air, water, land and living
resources . . . for the use and enjoyment of this and all future
generations."' 116 For them, non-compliance results in chastise-
ment, injunction, and remand.
A steward is an administrator, one who guards a valuable
possession. The first element of the word, "ste," is of uncer-
tain origin, most probably from the Old English word "stig,"
meaning house, dwelling. 117 The element "ward" is found in
112. Town of Henrietta v. New York Dep't of Envtl. Conservation, 76 A.D.2d
215, 430 N.Y.S.2d 440 (4th Dep't 1980).
The holding in Henrietta is now incorporated in the New York State Depart-
ment of Environmental Conservation Regulations, 6 N.Y.C.R.R. § 617.3(b) (1987).
See D. Snider & G. Levine, "A Prolegomenon to Understanding the Developer's True
Statutory Responsibilities Under SEQRA," 5 TouRo L.R. 255, 277 (Spring 1989).
113. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370b (1988).
114. Id. § 4331(b).
115. 18 THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 625 (2d ed. 1989).
116. N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 8-0103(8) (McKinney 1984).
117. 10 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 936 (1st ed. 1933).
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several languages. It means watching or guarding.11
A trustee is a fiduciary, a guardian who has legal respon-
sibilities. When the law talks about trust it is not a vague con-
cept. There is a continuum of generational responsibility. The
concept applies equally to every person whose activity ad-
versely affects the environment, as it does to enforcers with a
legal duty to protect the environment from waste. Expression
of the trustee concept is found in NEPA,"19 the Comprehen-
sive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability
Act (CERCLA), 2° and the Clean Water Act, 2 1 as well as in
state environmental quality review acts. Trustee, guardian,
and steward are words that connote the highest level of trust-
worthiness and responsibility. With responsibility comes ex-
pectation and accountability. Expectation fosters demands
and pressures which influence enforcement and interpretation
alike.
If a person is unable to protect his or her rights because
of minority, infirmity, or some other incapacity, the courts
will appoint a trustee or a guardian ad litem to represent him.
The environment, essentially passive as it is, is like an inca-
pacitated person who needs a trustee or a guardian ad litem to
protect its interest. Its bounty depends on the maintenance of
many balances. 2 ' It is in this sense that the laws can be re-
garded as a mediator between man and the environment. The
laws direct the stewards and trustees to intercede on behalf of
the environment.
To follow through with the analogy, on the federal level
the environment is represented by the Environmental Protec-
118. 12 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 84 (1st ed. 1933).
119. 42 U.S.C. § 4331(c).
120. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(f)(2) (1988). CERCLA provides for the designation of fed-
eral and state "trustees" who are authorized to assess natural resource damages and
press claims for the recovery of such damages, both under CERCLA §§ 107(f)(2), 111,
122(j)(2), 42 U.S.C. §§ 9607(f)(2), 9611, 96220)(2), and under the Clean Water Act, 42
U.S.C. § 1321 (1988). See Ohio v. United States Dep't of Interior, 880 F.2d 432 (D.C.
Cir. 1989).
121. 33 U.S.C. § 1321.
122. See R. CARSON, SILENT SPRING (1962); books and articles by Barry Com-
moner, including THE CLOSING CIRCLE (1971) and MAKING PEACE WITH THE PLANET
(1990).
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tion Agency (under CERCLA, RCRA, etc.), or by the Interior
Department (under the Endangered Species Act), or by the
Army Corps of Engineers (under The Clean Water Act).
When the trustee agency fails to act, most environmental stat-
utes authorize citizens to take action against persons who vio-
late regulatory standards.1l 8 Liberal rules of standing permit
class actions in other instances.
Because they are more assertive in their attitudes toward
protection, post-NEPA laws impose significantly greater de-
mands on those whose actions affect the environment than the
prior conservation laws. This is demonstrated in the judicial
decisions that interpret post-NEPA laws. Failure to comply
with specific procedural and substantive requirements results
in severe consequences: injunctions, criminal liability, and sig-
nificant financial penalties.""4 Indeed, an argument can be
made that conservation laws expand in interpretive possibili-
ties because of the existence of the more affirmative and in-
terventionalist attitudes expressed in the environmental laws.
In any event, trustee, guardian, and steward are words
that connote the highest level of trustworthiness and responsi-
bility. With responsibility comes expectation and accountabil-
ity. Expectation fosters demands and pressures which influ-
ence enforcement and interpretation alike. As already noted,
expectation is registered expressly and implicitly in language
and tone. If you change language, tone and expectation are
changed.
B. Protecting the Snail Darter
Laws protective of the environment and nature do not
stop with individuals and private organizations. Regulatory
123. Of course, the citizen in a citizens' suit, or an opponent of an action likely to
have a significant effect on the environment must discharge its burden of proving
that actions or conduct violate the law.
124. Under the Internal Revenue Code, a "fine or similar penalty paid to a gov-
ernment for the violation of any law" is not allowed as a business expense. I.R.C. §
162(f) (1988).
One court rejected a taxpayer's argument that the Code precludes deduction of
only those civil penalties that serve a punitive purpose. Colt Indus. v. United States,
880 F.2d 1311, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
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agencies also have responsibilities. One striking case, Tennes-
see Valley Authority (TVA) v Hill,' decided by the United
States Supreme, Court involved the snail darter. This three
inch fish is found in a habitat that would have been destroyed
by the operation of the proposed Tellico Dam. "It may seem
curious to some," the U.S. Supreme Court held, "that the sur-
vival of a relatively small number of three-inch fish among all
the countless millions of species extant would require the per-
manent halting of a virtually completed dam for which Con-
gress has expended more than $100 million." 2 6
In concluding that the explicit provisions of the Endan-
gered Species Act 2 7 required precisely that result,12 8 the
Court stated:
One would be hard pressed to find a statutory provision
whose terms were any plainer than those in § 7 of the
Endangered Species Act. Its very words affirmatively
command all federal agencies "to insure that actions au-
thorized, funded, or carried out (by them do not) jeop-
ardize the continued existence" of an endangered species
or "result in the destruction or modification of habitat of
such species . . . ." This language admits of no exception.
Nonetheless, petitioner urges, as do the dissenters, that
the Act cannot reasonably be interpreted as applying to a
federal project which was well under way when Congress
passed the Endangered Species Act of 1973.129
For TVA to sustain its position, the Court explained, "we
would be forced to ignore the ordinary meaning of plain lan-
guage." 8 0 The Court continued, "it has not been shown, for
example, how TVA can close the gates of the Tellico Dam
without 'carrying out' an action that has been 'authorized' and
125. Tennessee Valley Authority v Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978).
126. Id. at 172.
127. 87 Stat. 884 (1973), 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (1988).
128. Cf. Defenders of Wildlife v. Lujan, 882 F.2d 1294 (8th Cir. 1990), in which
the court rejected the interpretation of the Secretary of the Interior concerning a
limitation on his authority.
129. Tennessee Valley Auth., 437 U.S. at 173 (citation omitted).
130. Id.
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'funded' by a federal agency. Nor can we understand how such
action will 'insure' that the snail darter's habitat is not
disrupted.""13
The Court found that it could arrive at the meaning in-
tended by Congress by examining an earlier, less comprehen-
sive act, the Endangered Species Act of 1966. In the earlier
act, Congress qualified the obligation of federal agencies by
stating that they should seek to preserve endangered species
only insofar as is practicable and "consistent with [their] pri-
mary purposes."'1 32 The Court found that "[1]ikewise, every
bill introduced in 1973 contained a qualification similar to
that found in the earlier statutes."133
However, during committee hearings for amending the
Endangered Species Act, a representative of the Sierra Club
attacked the use of this wording, because it "could be con-
strued to be a declaration of congressional policy that other
agency purposes are necessarily more important than protec-
tion of endangered species and would always prevail if conflict
were to occur. 1' 34 The final version of the 1973 Act, therefore,
omitted all the reservations. The Court held that, "[t]he
pointed omission of the type of qualifying language previously
included in endangered species legislation reveals a conscious
decision by Congress to give endangered species priority over
the "primary missions" of federal agencies." '35
In an attempt to retrieve its position, the TVA had in-
vited the Supreme Court to view the Endangered Species Act
"reasonably," and to shape a remedy that would accord "with
some modicum of common sense and the public weal. 13 6 To
this invitation the Supreme Court responded:
But is that our function? We have no expert knowledge
on the subject of endangered species, much less do we
have a mandate from the people to strike a balance of
131. Id.
132. Id. at 182 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 4758, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973)).
133. Id.
134. Id. (citation omitted).
135. Id. at 185.
136. Id. at 194 (quoting Powell, J., dissenting, id. at 196).
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equities on the side of the Tellico Dam. Congress has spo-
ken in the plainest of words, making it abundantly clear
that the balance has been struck in favor of affording en-
dangered species the highest of priorities, thereby adopt-
ing a policy which it described as "institutionalized
caution."1 -7
The majority's interpretation did not impress Justices
Powell and Blackmun. In their view the Court's construction
violated common sense, was not consistent with "the ordinary
meaning of plain language," and was a disservice to the public
weal.138 Nevertheless, the Court's interpretation of the Endan-
gered Species Act was consistent with post-NEPA attitudes.
It enforced the concept of trusteeship to the dismay of those
who would have had it otherwise.
C. Protecting Wetlands and Waterways
Under the Clean Water Act, the Army Corps of Engineers
has permitting jurisdiction over navigable waterways, includ-
ing wetlands extending from the waterways. In Buttrey v.
United States,39 the Court upheld a determination by the
Corps of Engineers involving protection of wetlands. Congress
has determined that "[w]etlands are vital areas that consti-
tute a productive and valuable public resource." ' " °
Buttrey's contention was that the Corps of Engineers
should have considered the public benefits that its construc-
tion of a proposed housing project would have created. But-
trey argued that filling in forty acres of wetland was a "mere
flyspeck" in relation to the entire watershed in which it was
located. The regulations note that "[a]lthough a particular al-
teration of wetlands may constitute a minor change, the cu-
137. Id.
138. Id. at 173. In remarking on Justice Powell's dissent that the meaning of
"actions" is "far from 'plain,'" the Court made reference to Lewis Carroll's classic
advice on the construction of language: "'When I use a word,' Humpty Dumpty said,
in rather a scornful tone, 'it means just what I choose it to mean-neither more nor
less.' " Id. at 174.
139. 690 F.2d 1170, 1182 (5th Cir. 1982).
140. 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (1976). See also 33 C.F.R. § 320.4(b)(1).
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mulative effect of numerous such piecemeal changes often re-
sults in a major impairment of the wetland resources."1"1 The
court concluded that Buttrey's argument amounted to a de-
mand that the Corps of Engineers engage in precisely the kind
of limited review of "piecemeal" changes that the regulations
forbid.1"2
Agencies cannot avoid accountability. This notion is rein-
forced over and over by legislative declarations. It is also sup-
ported by contemporaneous statements which make clear
what is expected from the agencies and, conversely, what is
expected from the regulated communities. In Action for Ra-
tional Transit v. West Side Highway Project,'14  which also
illustrates agency failure, Judge Griesa wrote:
Under the mandate of NEPA, the Corps [of Engineers]
was required to make a full disclosure of the information
about fishery resources, and to give an opportunity for
comment by interested parties .... The total failure of
the Corps to comply with these obligations has been
demonstrated beyond any question. At no point did the
Corps make any effort of its own to ascertain the facts
about marine life in the interpier area .... The Corps
had no right to swallow up these issues in the privacy of
its bosom. It was required to make fair and open disclo-
sure not only of the available facts, but of the responsible
scientific views as to the risks involved in the loss of this
habitat.""
The Corps of Engineers had a procedural responsibility
141. 33 C.F.R. § 320.4(b)(3).
142. Buttrey, 690 F.2d at 1181. See Bersani v. Robichaud, 850 F.2d 36 (2d Cir.
1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1089 (1989). Action brought by developers to challenge
the final determination of the Environmental Protection Agency denying them per-
mission to construct a shopping mall on a swamp. The denial was upheld and the
judgment affirmed. Id. at 38.
143. 536 F. Supp. 1225 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
144. Id. at 1253. Cf. H.O.M.E.S. v. New York State Urban Dev. Corp., 69 A.D.2d
222, 418 N.Y.S.2d 827 (4th Dep't 1979), where the Court took the New York State
Urban Development Corporation to task for failing to comply with SEQRA require-
ments. "Like the proverbial ostrich, respondents have incredibly put out of sight and
mind a clear environmental problem." 69 A.D.2d 222, 231, 418 N.Y.S.2d 827, 831.
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which it failed to discharge. Because the Corps disobeyed an
explicit command of NEPA, the court vacated the approval.
D. Protecting Public Lands
CERCLA allows trustees of public lands to recover not
only for damages, but also for the "reasonable costs of assess-
ing such injury, destruction, or loss."'" The law provides that:
The President, or the authorized representative of any
State, shall act on behalf of the public as trustee of [the]
natural resources to recover for the costs of replacing or
restoring such resources. Sums recovered . . . shall be
available for use to restore, rehabilitate, or acquire the
equivalent of such natural resources by the appropriate
agencies . 1.. 46
The law continues that damage assessment regulations must
"take into consideration factors including, but not limited to,
replacement value, and ability of the ecosystem or resource to
recover."'
147
In 1986, the Department of the Interior (DOI) promul-
gated regulations for natural resource damage assessment. 4 '
Under the regulations, the trustee is assigned a number of
tasks which range from establishing the extent of the damages
to the environment and identifying the potentially responsible
parties, to preparing a restoration plan and determining dam-
ages. The regulations address two types of situations, A and
B. Type A applies to simplified assessments with regard to
valuing damage resulting from minor, short-duration releases
of hazardous waste or oil.'" 9 Type B applies to physical inju-
ries of greater magnitude. 150 The regulations proposed that
damages be measured by the lesser of either restoration or re-
145. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(C).
146. Id. § 9607(f)(1).
147. Id. The law proscribes "double recovery" for damages to natural resources.
Id.
148. 43 C.F.R. pt. 11 (1990).
149. 43 C.F.R. §§ 11.40-11.41 (1990).
150. Id. §§ 11.60-11.84.
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placement costs of the natural resource or certain lost
values.151
In a lawsuit challenging the regulations, the court was not
impressed by the DOT's argument that such a measure cor-
rectly expressed congressional intentions, or that it was effi-
cient.152 In rejecting the lesser-of damage concept, the court
concluded that Congress expressed a "distinct preference" 8
for restoring damaged natural resources, rather than compen-
sation for lost use values defined in narrow terms. 5 DOI ar-
gued that its lesser-of rule made sense from an economic
standpoint, since one would not want to restore a resource if
the cost of doing so exceeded the value society placed on it. 55
However, the court found that the Congressional preference
for restoration was motivated not by a hostility to this reason-
ing per se, but rather by skepticism regarding human ability
to measure a resource's true value. 156
The conflict between the lesser-of rule and full restora-
tion involves determining whether the true value of a resource
is based on its "use value" or "non-use values."' 57 DOI solved
the problem by excluding non-use values from consideration.
The regulations (as they applied to that particular subject)
were remanded to DOI.
V. Fundamental Tasks
Courts worry over legislative intention, examine wording
and syntax, study punctuation and tense, compare provisions,
analyze terms, ponder why one subject is addressed and an-
other omitted, adduce evidence from the text and context,
make deductions, and draw inferences. The purpose is to es-
tablish meaning definitively; to make it clear to those who ad-
minister the laws and to those who must obey them, what the
151. Id. §§ 11.80-11.88.
152. Ohio v. United States Dep't of Interior, 880 F.2d 432 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
153. Id. at 459.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 456.
156. Id. at 457.
157. See id. at 438-59.
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laws are and how they are to be enforced. It has been seen
that lawmakers, no less than other communicators, organize
their material with deliberation, and for specific ends. Atti-
tude and tone are integral to meaning and are direct evidence
of intention.
Courts are the final arbiters of meaning, just as much as
they are the determiners of liability and the declarers of rights
and duties. What laws say, and what and who they regulate or
effect are frequently threshold disputes. Interpretation of lan-
guage and legislative intent are the province of courts, and are
discovered in a process known as construction. Construction is
to law as textual analysis is to literature. What does the text
say and what does it mean? If one subject is dealt with and
another is not, that is evidence of attitude. Tolerating an act,
even under constraint, is one thing, forbidding it is another.
The word "construe" is related to "construct," which
means to build up, to put together.15 8 To construe a law is to
analyze its construction and show its meaning. Whenever
there is a question as to a party's responsibility or a conflict
between an action which a regulated person wishes to take
and the protection of the environment, decisions tend increas-
ingly to favor the environment. 159 This is so whether the cul-
pable "person" is a governmental entity or an individual.
A. Application to Government
Although there is no question that environmental laws
apply to government entities, there is a disagreement among
circuits as to what immunity the United States enjoys. Gov-
ernment entities can be compelled to act, or can be prohibited
from particular acts by injunction, but it is uncertain whether
they have to pay fines. There cannot be an implied waiver of
158. E. PARTRIDGE, ORIGINS, A SHORT ETYMOLOGICAL DICTIONARY OF MODERN
ENGLISH, 675-76 (1958).
159. It has been noted by a number of courts, for example, that CERCLA "is not
a model of statutory clarity." United States v. Maryland Bank & Trust Co., 632 F.
Supp. 573, 578 (D.Md. 1986). CERCLA "has acquired a well-deserved notoriety for
vaguely drafted provisions and an indefinite, if not contradictory, legislative history."
Amoco Oil Co. v. Borden, Inc., 889 F.2d 664, 667 (5th Cir. 1989). The final version of
CERCLA was enacted as a last minute compromise among competing bills.
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sovereign immunity. 60 "Waivers of immunity must be 'con-
strued strictly in favor of the sovereign' and not enlarge[d]...
beyond what the language requires."1 61
Section 6961 of the Resource Conservation and Recovery
Act (RCRA) provides that every federal department, agency,
and instrumentality "shall be subject to, and comply with, all
Federal, State, interstate, and local requirements, both sub-
stantive and procedural (including any requirements for per-
mits or reporting or any provisions for injunctive relief and
such sanctions as may be imposed by a court to enforce such
relief), respecting control and abatement of solid waste or haz-
ardous waste disposal .... 62
In a Sixth Circuit case, 63 in which the Department of En-
ergy argued that it enjoyed sovereign immunity from suits for
civil penalties, the circuit court pointed out that the first sen-
tence of section 6961 subjects the DOE to "any requirement,"
including "sanctions," to the same extent as a private entity
under the Act."6" It reinforced its textual analysis by reference
to the definition of "sanction" in the Compact Edition of the
Oxford English Dictionary.' 6 The term means the "specific
penalty enacted in order to enforce obedience to the law." '"6
An opposite conclusion was reached in a Tenth Circuit
decision.1 67 There, the circuit court pointed out that Congress
"knew how to indicate an intent to waive federal sovereign
immunity to state civil penalites, and it did not do so when it
enacted RCRA."168 The court based its analysis on comparing
the RCRA provision with provisions of the Clean Air Act, the
Clean Water Act, and the Safe Drinking Water Act. In these
160. United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 399 (1976) (quoting United States v.
King, 395 U.S. 1, 4 (1969)).
161. Mitzelfelt v. Department of Air Force, 903 F.2d 1293, 1295 (10th Cir. 1990)
(quoting Ruckleshaus v. Sierra Club, 463 U.S. 680, 686 (1983) (quoting McMahon v.
United States, 342 U.S. 25, 27 (1951)).
162. 42 U.S.C. § 6961.
163. Ohio v. Department of Energy, 904 F.2d 1058, 1060 (6th Cir. 1990).
164. Id. at 1062.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Mitzelfelt v. Department of Air Force, 903 F.2d 1293 (10th Cir. 1990).
168. Id. at 1295-96.
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Acts sovereign immunity is waived for "requirements, admin-
istrative authority [or authorities], and process and
sanctions." 169
In reaching its decision, the Tenth Circuit discounted the
reference in RCRA § 6001(a) to "sanctions" in parenthesis -
"such sanctions as may be imposed by a court to enforce such
relief ' '170 -and concluded that "the penalty New Mexico
seeks to exact from the Air Force is not a 'requirement...
respecting control and abatement of solid waste or hazardous
waste disposal.' ,,171
In a footnote, the court explained that "[s]ubsequent
Congresses have interpreted § 6001 as waiving federal sover-
eign immunity from state civil penalties .... However, the
views of later Congresses are of little value in ascertaining the
intent of the Congress which passed the legislation.' ' 7
All of this goes to demonstrate that the RCRA authors
either were not sufficiently careful in their choices of language
and syntax to assure a unanimity of understanding, or that
the Tenth Circuit misconstrued Congress' intention by failing
to recognize its use of "sanction" in juxtaposition to "any
requirements."
B. Application to Private Parties
In July 1971, a chemical company made arrangements to
dispose of its wastes by dumping 55-gallon drums on a farm
near Verona, Missouri. During April 1980, the EPA conducted
an on-site investigation. It exposed and sampled thirteen of
the 55-gallon drums, which were found to be badly deterio-
rated; water and soil samples were also taken. The samples
were found to contain "alarmingly" high concentrations of di-
oxin, TCP, and toluene.173
169. Id. at 1295.
170. Id. at 1294 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 6961).
171. Id. at 1295 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 6961).
172. Id. at 1296 (citing Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc.,
447 U.S. 102, 117-18 (1980)).
173. United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical and Chem. Co. (NEPACCO),
579 F. Supp. 823 (W.D. Mo. 1984), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, and remanded, 810
F.2d 726, 730 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 848 (1987).
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Defendant argued that it should not be found liable for
the costs of cleaning up the site because its actions antedated
the passage of CERCLA, which did not become effective until
December 11, 1980. The court held that, although CERCLA
does not expressly provide for retroactivity, it is manifestly
clear that Congress intended CERCLA to have retroactive ef-
fect. The reason is that:
The language used in the key liability provision ... refers
to actions and conditions in the past tense: "any person
who at the time of disposal of any hazardous substances
owned or operated" ... "any person who . . . arranged
with a transporter for transport for disposal" . . . "any
person who accepted any hazardous substances for trans-
port to ... sites selected by such person."174
Furthermore:
[T]he statutory scheme itself is overwhelmingly remedial
and retroactive .... In order to be effective, CERCLA
must reach past conduct. CERCLA's backward looking
focus is confirmed by the legislative history.'"
Taking CERCLA's "backward looking focus" as a given,
is the statute to be regarded as retroactive under every cir-
cumstance? One defendant argued in a government suit for
natural resource damages that the action was barred by rea-
son of the statute of limitations.'7 6 The court examined the
statutory provision "with due respect for rules of grammar
and punctuation. 1 7 The court found that, although CER-
CLA did not bar suits to recover "response costs," it did pre-
clude actions for damages for injuries to natural resources
which arose prior to the effective date of the law. "The Court
reads the ... phrases as independent clauses which are sepa-
rated by the conjunction 'nor,' set off by commas, and modi-
174. NEPACCO, 810 F.2d at 733 (emphasis added).
175. Id.
176. United States v. Mottolo, 605 F. Supp. 898, 901 (D.N.H. 1985).
177. Id. at 903.
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fled by the limiting, dependent clause 'more than three years
' M178
Each of these three cases illustrates a particular mental-
ity. A party either refuses to recognize that it has an environ-
mental responsibility, or urges a decision that would give it an
economic advantage. Courts are particularly careful to demon-
strate that they have adduced persuasive evidence, and that
their decisions are based on a proper, although strict, reading
of statutes and regulations.
In the snail darter case the Court responded to what it
regarded as an express statutory command. Equally, there are
examples of courts responding when the command is implicit.
In Inland Steel Co. v. EPA,1 79 for example, the court found no
indication that Congress intended to exempt the owners of
deep injection wells from regulation under RCRA. The court
stated that the "language of the Act does not so compellingly
proscribe such a result that we must do or die without reason-
ing why." ' However, the court concluded: "If the language
does not compel, neither is it deformed by (sic) the EPA's in-
terpretation . . . and which is supported by the policies that
appear to animate the Act and rebutted by no other sources of
interpretive wisdom." ' Judge Posner's emphasis on policy is
pragmatically correct. The ultimate consideration is whether a
particular result is consistent with expectations enunciated in
public policy.
Although there are contrary examples, environmental
laws tend to be applied embracively; financial costs are less
important than environmental values. This tendency is illus-
trated by cases involving owners who sell their property "as
is, '"182 financial institutions who foreclose on property,183 and
178. Id. The provision in issue reads: "No claim may be presented, nor may an
action be commenced for damages under this title, unless that claim is presented or
action commenced within three years from the date of the discovery of the loss or the
date of enactment of this Act, whichever is later .... 42 U.S.C. § 961.2(d).
179. 901 F.2d 1419 (7th Cir. 1990).
180. Id. at 1424.
181. Id. The author of this opinion, Hon. Richard A. Posner, is the author of
LAW AND LITERATURE: A MISUNDERSTOOD RELATION (1988).
182. See International Clinical Laboratories, Inc. v. Stevens, 710 F. Supp. 466
(E.D.N.Y. 1989).
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construction contractors'84 who develop property. Equally
striking illustrations can be found in NEPA and RCRA cases.
Thus, in one case, the court held that the "as is" clause in
a property sales contract did not preclude an action by the
purchaser against the seller to recover hazardous waste
cleanup costs under CERCLA, 8 5 because such a clause bars
only actions based on breach of warranty. Regardless of any
contractual provision, if the purchaser was unable to meet its
statutory obligations, either because it had filed for bank-
ruptcy or for any other reason, the seller could never be re-
lieved of its obligations for cleanup costs incurred by the gov-
ernment. However, the seller may by contract maintain a
claim for indemnification or contribution against an economi-
cally viable purchaser.
In addition, under CERCLA the liability for all costs and
expenses associated with cleaning up inactive or abandoned
hazardous waste sites is imposed on a strict, joint and several,
and retroactive basis. 186 Although this has been tempered to
some degree by the enactment of the Superfund Amendment
Reauthorization Act of 1986 (SARA),187 the law as originally
enacted implicated all culpable property owners in the chain
of title, including non-culpable current owners/operators. It
has been held-that the court "will not interpret [the liability
provision of CERCLA] in any way that apparently frustrates
the statute's goal, in the absence of a specific congressional
intent otherwise."' 88
183. See United States v. Maryland Bank & Trust, 632 F. Supp. 573 (D.Md.
1986); but see United States v. Mirabile, 15 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,992
(E.D. Pa. 1985); United States v. Fleet Factors Corp., 901 F.2d 1550 (11th Cir. 1990).
"Had Congress intended to absolve secured creditors from ownership liability, it
would have done so. Instead, the statutory language chosen by Congress explicitly
holds secured creditors liable if they participate in the management of the facility."
Id. at 1557.
184. See Tanglewood East Homeowners v. Charles-Thomas, Inc., 849 F.2d 1568
(5th Cir. 1988).
185. International Clinical Laboratories, 710 F. Supp. at 469.
186. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(32). See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
187. Pub. L. No. 99-499 (Oct. 17, 1989) 100 Stat. 1613-1782. See U.S.E.P.A.,
Guidance on Landowner Liability under Section 107(a)(1) of CERCLA, (1989).
188. Dedham Water Co. v. Cumberland Farms Dairy, 805 F.2d 1074, 1081 (1st
Cir. 1986)(quoting New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1045 (2d Cir.
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These decisions imply a functional approach to responsi-
bility. The person who causes or creates any hazardous condi-
tion is strictly liable, but if that person is out of business or
unavailable, then the transferees are liable. Innocence is not a
defense to a government action. This policy most effectively
accomplishes the desired goal. In any event, even though it
may be burdensome, cleanup can only enhance the value of
the affected property.
Strictness of application is also illustrated in New York v.
Shore Realty.189 In Shore, the defendant corporation pur-
chased property with knowledge that it contained hazardous
waste.190 Further, barrels of chemicals were deposited after
conveyance of title, 9' but the chemicals were not generated
by Shore and it did not give permission for the barrels to be
delivered to the site."e" The fact that Shore did not partici-
pate in generating or transporting hazardous waste on the site
was found irrelevant to the issue of its liability.'
At the same time that Shore and similar cases illuminate
how severely the law is applied, 9" they also illustrate a trend
to hold officers and directors personally liable. In Kelly v.
Arco Indus. Corp.,9 ' the court held that in determining the
individual liability of a corporate officer, it should weigh the
factors of the corporate officer's "degree of authority in gen-
eral and specific responsibility for health and safety practices,
including hazardous waste disposal."' 9 The court went on to
1985)).
189. 759 F.2d 1032 (2d Cir. 1985).
190. Id. at 1038-39.
191. Id. at 1039.
192. Id. at 1049.
193. Id. at 1044-45.
194. See also United States v. Carr, 880 F.2d 1550 (2d Cir. 1989). (Carr was a
civilian employee at Fort Drum. His position was that of a maintenance foreman on
the Fort's firing range, and as part of his duties he assigned other civilian workers to
various chores on the range. On one particular day he directed several workers to
dispose of old cans of waste paint in a small, man-made pit on the range. He was
found criminally liable and sentenced to one year in jail and one year's probation.)
195. 723 F. Supp. 1214 (W.D. Mich. 1989).
196. Id. at 1219. CERCLA defines "owner or operator" in the case of any aban-
doned facility as "any person who owned, operated, or otherwise controlled activities
at such facility immediately prior to such abandonment." 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A)(iii).
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explain that such a fact-specific examination would be consis-
tent with CERCLA's goals:
[Tihis standard will encourage increased responsibility
with increased authority within a corporation. I take this
to be a positive result, and thus a better standard than
one which measures only the most direct knowledge or in-
volvement in waste disposal activity, because it encour-
ages responsible conduct instead of causing high level cor-
porate individuals 'not to see' and 'to avoid getting
involved with waste disposal at their facilities.'. . . Such a
liability standard here will encourage increased respon-
sibility as an individual's stake in the corporation in-
creases. I anticipate that responsibility undertaken will
also be less frequently neglected.97
Strict application is a predicate for increased responsibility.
In theory, and no doubt in practice also, individuals who un-
derstand their exposure will be more careful.
In another case, Wickland Oil Terminals v. Asarco,
Inc.,'19 plaintiff argued that it was entitled to invoke the inno-
cent land-owner defense promulgated under SARA since it
had not caused or contributed to the creation of the hazard-
ous waste on the property. The court found, however, that
since Wickland had retained consultants and lawyers who
were familiar with the environmental problems at the prop-
erty it was charged with the knowledge possessed by its
agents. As a result, Wickland could not establish that it was
an innocent purchaser. 99
While manufacturers of hazardous substances do not
have a responsibility for the disposal of their products by
their customers,00 they cannot divest themselves of responsi-
bility for unsafe manufacturing practices (OSHA, Clean
Water Act) and for transporting hazardous substances (Haz-
197. Kelly, 723 F. Supp. at 1220 (emphasis added).
198. 19 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,855 (N.D.Cal. 1988).
199. Id. at 20,856.
200. See Dayton Indep. School Dist. v. U.S. Mineral Prods., 906 F.2d 1059 (5th
Cir. 1990) (no liability for asbestos manufacturers).
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ardous Materials Transportation Act). A final example of in-
clusiveness is illustrated in NL Industries, Inc. v. Department
of Transportation.21 In NL Industries a foreign company or-
dered chemical products to be delivered to a freight broker,
for transshipment to a foreign destination. 02 Drums of chemi-
cals delivered to the air carrier did not comply with the re-
quirements of the Hazardous Materials Transportation Act.203
In the resulting lawsuit against the manufacturer by the
Department of Transportation, even though the manufacturer
conceded that the drums did not comply with the regulations,
it argued that the Act did not apply to it because it was
neither the shipper nor the carrier of the drums.2 0 The court
held that the statute's application to a particular person was
to be approached functionally, based upon its activities "with-
out regard to whether it is a shipper or a carrier. 2 0 5 The court
found that the implementing regulation was consistent with
this interpretation.206 It provides: "No person may offer or ac-
cept hazardous material for transportation in commerce un-
less that material is properly classed, described, packaged,
marked, labeled, and in condition for shipment as required or
authorized by this subchapter. '20 7 The law placed responsibil-
ity with any shipper or carrier who transports hazardous
materials or causes them to be transported.0 8
Explicitly and implicitly environmental laws demand re-
sponsibility and exact a toll if their expectations are not satis-
fied. Courts have concluded that the laws' purposes and poli-
cies justify constructions which authorize greater
inclusiveness, which in turn significantly expand liability.
201. 901 F.2d 141 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
202. Id. at 142.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. 49 C.F.R. § 171.2(a)(1990).
208. The court noted that the statutory definition of "transportation" clearly
contemplates that the responsibility may rest with more than one person, and noth-
ing in the dictionary definition of "cause" suggests that an event may not have more
than one cause. NL Industries, Inc., 901 F.2d at 143 (citing 49 U.S.C. § 1802).
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VI. Conclusion
It is more than the technical expression of law that stat-
utes convey. Readers derive from words more than their lit-
eral, denotative meanings. Words convey attitudes and expec-
tations. Statutory text is intended to elicit a particular
response and the particular response it demands is clearly im-
plicit from the rhetorical evidence.
In law, as in literature, text is taken seriously. Courts'
field of inquiry includes both text and context. When courts
interpret statutes, they take into account their language, rhet-
oric, and composition, as well as the dialogue of competing in-
terests in their formation. The inferences courts draw are
themselves chosen from a number of possible interpretations.
Different courts and judges draw different inferences. This is
most dramatically seen in close decisions and reversals, as
cases make their way up the judicial ladder.
We have seen that rhetorical strategies have a place in
the discussion of environmental laws because they are so ele-
mental to meaning. The language and rhetoric of the statu-
tory text is the starting point of any consideration of responsi-
bility and enforcement. The purpose of textual analysis is to
arrive at an understanding of how the laws are constructed
and how rhetoric contributes to understanding legislative in-
tention. Rhetoric is inextricably interwoven with communica-
tion and is inseparable from it.
We have also seen that the environmental laws have an
extraordinary reach. No private or public person whose activi-
ties and actions affect the environment is exempt from the
laws or free from regulatory attention. Some laws achieve
their aim by constraining or controlling practices harmful to
the environment, others by instituting coercive measures to
restore past damage, and still others by imposing conditions
before permitting changes that may affect the environment.
The choices legislators make are consequential in under-
standing attitudes and will affect interpretation. Attitude can
be explicit and immediately recognized, for example, when the
legislature speaks directly in "Findings" and "Declarations."
It may be implicit and inferrable from tone, and perhaps not
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even recognized until the text and context are examined, and
the evidence is adduced and interpreted. Whether explicit or
implicit, it is easier to comprehend the meaning of a commu-
nication if the reader understands that messages are not nec-
essarily self-revealing. The decoding of a statute is as much an
art as its formulation.
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